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When the HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY held a
symposium to discuss and debate provisions of the California Civil
Rights Initiative,' it provided what may well have been one of the
only public deliberations about the Initiative. Although the sympo-
sium was open to the public, most of the California electorate was
regrettably unable to attend. And so on election day most California
voters, who perhaps will have glimpsed a billboard or bumper sticker
urging either a yes or no vote, will go into a polling booth and cast
their ballot for or against an initiative about which they know little or
nothing. While much can be said about the content of the California
Civil Rights Initiative, this Essay is primarily concerned with the pro-
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comments on early drafts of this Essay.
1. A version of this Essay was originally presented by David L. Faigman at a sympo-
sium hosted by the HASTINGS CONSTITrrIONAL LAW QUARTERLY at the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, on March 28, 1996.
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cess that allows a generally uninformed voting population to deter-
mine the fate of such an initiative.
California is by no means unique in its voter initiative procedure,2
and this Essay is not unique in its focus on the state initiative process.
As the number of constitutionally suspect voter initiatives has in-
creased,3 so too has scholars' attention to the initiative process. 4 In
particular, many scholars have observed that Article IV, Section 4 of
the Constitution (commonly known as the "Guarantee Clause")' was
meant to protect against the untempered passions of the majority
manifested in recent state initiatives.
Most scholars who have addressed this topic suggest only that the
Guarantee Clause requires that the Supreme Court take a more active
role in reviewing the constitutionality of state initiative measures. In
2. Compare Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503,
1509 n.22 (1990) (twenty-six states have initiative processes that allow voters to enact legis-
lation or state constitutional amendments directly) with Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy
Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 735 (1988) (twenty-two states).
3. In recent years, state voter initiatives have provided a ready forum for a number of
discriminatory attacks against minority groups. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996) (striking down a Colorado proposition based on animus against homosexuals);
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 951 (9th Cir. 1995) (Brunetti, J.,
concurring) (concluding that Arizona's English-only initiative is a thinly disguised attempt
to disenfranchise non-English-speaking minorities), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996);
Tony Miller, Acting Secretary of State, Proposition 187, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAM-
PHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 8, 1994, at 50-55, 91-92 (denying medical, social, and
educational services to residents lacking appropriate immigration status); Hans A. Linde,
When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Ho-
mosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 19 (1993) (describing antihomosexual initiatives in
Oregon).
4. See Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebi-
scites, 79 CORNELL L. Rnv. 527 (1994); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee
Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 849 (1994); Eule, supra note 2; Foun-
taine, supra note 2; Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65
U. COLO. L. REv. 709 (1994); Linde, supra note 3; Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988);
David Schuman, Correspondence: A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 274 (1992); Thomas A. Smith, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation
of the Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870 (1993); Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The
Guarantee of Republican Government Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
208 (1987); Douglas H. Hsiao, Note, Invisible Cities: The Constitutional Status of Direct
Democracy in a Democratic Republic, 41 DuKE L.J. 1267 (1992); Comment, Judicial Re-
view of Initiative Constitutional Amendments, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 461 (1980); Debra F.
Salz, Note, Discrimination-Prone Initiatives and the Guarantee Clause: A Role for the
Supreme Court, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 100 (1993).
5. The Guarantee Clause provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4.
contrast, we argue in this Essay that the Guarantee Clause establishes
a per se prohibition against state initiatives. Part I of this Essay
briefly examines the historical origins of the Guarantee Clause and
the Founders' apprehensions of direct democracy. Part II observes
how modem state initiatives provide contemporary illustrations of the
Founders' philosophical concerns about direct democracy. Part III
concludes that state initiative measures constitute per se violations of
the Guarantee Clause and, accordingly, must be summarily rejected.
In so concluding, this Essay rejects proposals that courts review direct
legislation or certain genres of direct legislation under heightened
scrutiny.
I. Taming the Passions of the Majority: Madison's Foresight
Although absent from most academic scholarship on the Guaran-
tee Clause,6 the idea that state initiatives are per se violations of that
clause is not original. This thesis finds its origins in James Madison's
admonitions about the threat that factions pose to a democracy.
In The Federalist No. 10, Madison explained his preference for a
republic, "a government in which the scheme of representation takes
place[,] ' '7 over a "pure democracy," which he defined as "a society
consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer
the government in person."'8 This was no idle preference, but one de-
rived from Madison's concern about the dangers of factions. In a pure
democracy, Madison warned:
[A] common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt
by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results
from the form of the government itself; and there is nothing to
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an ob-
noxious individual.9
6. Only a few authors have suggested that the Guarantee Clause compels the conclu-
sion that state initiatives are per se unconstitutional. See Fountaine, supra note 2, at 738;
Hsiao, supra note 4.
7. THE FEDERALiST No. 10, at 133 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961)
[hereinafter Madison, Tim FEDERALISr No. 10].
8. Iad Madison explained:
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first,
the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of
country, over which the latter may be extended.
IcL at 133-34.
9. L at 133.
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Madison thus believed that the "factious spirit [that] has tainted our
public administrations"'" was most dangerous when there was nothing
to check its excesses."
Madison proposed the republican form as a check on the passions
of a potentially factious majority.' 2 Representative decisionmaking
offered a mechanism by which public views could be refined and en-
larged. In a republic, Madison believed, "the superior force of an in-
terested and overbearing majority"' 3 could be tempered by the
reasoned judgment of representatives acting for the common good.
Although Madison's eloquent defense of the republican form is
the one most often quoted, Madison was not alone among the Consti-
tution's Framers in his apprehension of direct democracy and his pref-
erence for representative government. Alexander Hamilton preferred
the republican form because, as he put it, when "the interests of the
people are at variance with their inclinations,' 4 elected representa-
tives are duty bound to withstand people's temporary delusions. In-
deed, some historians contend that the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention were more concerned about an excess of populism in the
state governments than they were about the weakness of the Articles
of Confederation. 5
The historical record indicates a consensus among the Framers:
A republican form of government was the best "safeguard against the
10. Id at 130.
11. Fisher Ames offered the following observations on popular passions in the context
of congressional elections:
I would not have the first wish, the momentary impulse of the publick mind, be-
come law. For it is not always the sense of the people, with whom, I admit, that
all power resides. On great questions, we first hear the loud clamours of passion,
artifice, and faction. I consider biennial elections as a security, that the sober,
second thought of the people shall be law.
Fisher Ames, Speech in the Convention of Massachusetts, on Biennial Elections (Jan.
1788), in WoRxs OF FIsHER AMEs 24 (John T. Kirkland ed., 1809).
12. Of course, the United States Constitution is replete with institutional checks and
balances designed to frustrate the temporal passions and prejudices of the governors. The
mandate of a republican form of government in the states is just one check, a check aimed
at the people when they become the lawmakers en masse.
13. Madison, THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 7, at 130.
14. Trm FEDERALIST No. 71, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961). Hamilton added as follows:
The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community
should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their
affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden
breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive.
15. Eule, supra note 2, at 1523 & n.80.
1060
tyranny of [majoritarian] passions. '16 Representative decisionmaking
was considered so critical that it was not only instituted at the federal
level but guaranteed at the state level.
Despite this guarantee, lawmaking by initiative is now a popular
practice in many states. The question, therefore, is whether and how
the Framers' fears of direct democracy are pertinent to the current
practice of state initiative decisionmaking.
II. Modern State Initiatives: The Incarnation of
Madison's Fears
Although modem initiative practices were virtually unknown to
the constitutional delegates,'17 "everything about the tone of the Con-
vention suggests that they would have looked upon such a scheme
'with a feeling akin to horror.""18 Assumptions about the Framers'
beliefs alone may not be sufficient justification to condemn what has
become a very popular practice. However, original intent and original
constitutional structure are not the only justifications for finding that
state initiative processes are per se unconstitutional. The great
strength of our Constitution has been its capacity to evolve and thus
respond to new circumstances. Good principles and reasons some-
times support changing interpretations over time. 19 But in the case of
the Guarantee Clause and its preference for the republican form, time
has only demonstrated the Founders' wisdom.
Although we believe the initiative process, especially in Califor-
nia, exemplifies the dangers the Founders associated with pure de-
mocracy, counterexamples are always available. Government is an
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 415 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
17. Eule, supra note 2, at n.82.
18. Id. at 1523 n.83 (quoting Charles Beard, Introduction to DocumENTS ON THE
STATE-WIDE INITIAnVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 29 (Charles Beard & Bin Shultz eds.,
1912)).
19. Examples abound of constitutional interpretations that have evolved to accommo-
date more modem contexts than the Founders were capable of imagining. For example,
"interstate commerce" as the Founders understood it, obviously did not anticipate that
electronic transfers on an "information superhighway" would be one of the modes of trans-
portation that phrase would come to govern. See, e.g., Pie-a-State Pa., Inc., v. Reno, 76
F.3d 1294, 1303 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir.
1995). Similarly, "equal protection" means something very different today than it did in
the post-Civil War era in which it was drafted. "Equal protection" has expanded as our
Nation has expanded its understanding and appreciation of the meaning of equality. See
Owen Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Tune Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the
Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 742 (1974); J.
Harvie Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces
of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
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imperfect business, and we do not mean to suggest that the republican
form invariably produces wise and prudent outcomes.20 Our thesis
rests on more modest and realistic premises. We analyze the modem
context merely to determine whether the original premises and logic
that informed the construction of the constitutional structure remain
in force. What follows is an analysis of the Founders' still accurate
premises, as found in the context of state initiatives, and anecdotal
explanations of additional problems presented by modem initiative
processes that could not have been anticipated by the Founders.
A. Absence of Deliberation
The starting point for any evaluation of the relative merits of di-
rect democracy is the observation that legislative decisionmaking typi-
cally involves complex questions of public policy. In part, Madison's
preference for representative democracy was based on his belief that
such complex questions are refined and enlarged when they are sub-
jected to discussion and debate by a representative body. Delibera-
tion expands the diversity of views heard and affords a more rounded
and fuller response to complex and difficult policy matters.
Some commentators argue that legislation enacted by representa-
tive bodies is just as unsound as that enacted by initiative, or that the
criticisms of direct legislation cannot be supported with sufficient em-
pirical data.21 Madison did not express such a categorical condemna-
tion of pure democracy or naive endorsement of representative
democracy. 2 Indeed, while empirical conclusions regarding the rela-
tive merits of each method in practice would undoubtedly be interest-
20. Rather, we tend to agree with P.J. O'Rourke's admonition: "Feeling good about
government is like looking on the bright side of any catastrophe. When you quit looking
on the bright side, the catastrophe is still there." PJ. O'RouRKE, National Busybodies, in
PARLIAMENT OF WHORES 49, 49 (1991).
21. See, ag., Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice
Perspective, 67 CHi.-KEINT L. REv. 707, 709-10 (1991) ("[I]t is not at all clear that the me-
dian plebiscite voter is systematically inferior to the median representative."); Robin Char-
low, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L.
REv. 527, 626 (1994) (arguing that "one could pick and choose among [the thousands of
plebiscites] to illustrate an argument either way").
22. Madison described a constitutional preference for a process that was the lesser of
two evils, not an ultimate panacea. In fact, Madison recognized that the effect of represen-
tative government may be inverted: "Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of
sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suf-
frages, and then betray the interests, of the people." Madison, Tim FEDERALIST No. 10,
supra note 7, at 134. Madison suggested that the solution to the problem of factious repre-
sentatives is the preference for an extensive republic over a small one. Ild. The possibility
that representatives could also be influenced by factions did not affect Madison's prefer-
ence for representative government.
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ing, they are unnecessary: No one could seriously contend that
complex problems are better solved in the absence of discussion and
debate. And no matter how creative the suggestions from defenders
of pure democracy, the simple truth is that representative lawmaking
includes, as part of its process, formal deliberation and debate. The
state initiative process does not.
B. Absence of Opportunity to Compromise
Closely related to the problem of lack of opportunity for deliber-
ation and time for refinement of ideas is the fact that initiatives "offer
only binary choices, but the set of solutions to a given problem is sel-
dom so limited. The fact that we restrict ourselves to two alternatives
should not obscure the fact that we start off with many more. '23 Initi-
ative lawmaking leaves no room for compromise or amendment.
Consequently, the initiative process "merely aggregate[s] individual
opinion, without any particular structural provision for dialogue or di-
alectic. '24 Perhaps the greatest strength of democracy is lost when it
is exercised in its pure form. The democratic principle presumes that
a government "of the people and by the people" will craft laws with
the subtlety to be a benefit "for the people."' ' 5 The initiative process
results in polarization of views. The subtlety and nuance that typically
results from compromise is annulled by this process.
Additionally, the reduction of an infinite number of alternatives
to a finite number of choices on an initiative ballot also results in a
phenomenon dubbed "voter overload. '2 6 When voters are required
to choose the "least bad" alternative, the true preferences of the ma-
jority are distorted and irrational decisionmaking often results.2 7 Ex-
amples of voter overload demonstrate the Founders' intuitive
observation that it is better to make decisions with a full appreciation
of all various alternatives.
23. Eule, supra note 2, at 1520-21.
24. Charlow, supra note 4, at 535-36 & n.31.
25. Pure democracy too closely illustrates Oscar Wilde's caustic observation: "De-
mocracy means simply the bludgeoning of the people, by the people, for the people."
CHARLES HENNING, THE Wrr & WISDOM OF POLmcs 59 (1989) (quoting OSCAR WILDE,
THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM (1895)).
26. See Hsiao, supra note 4, at 1284-85 & n.105 (citing BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEw AGE 203 (1984)).
27. L
Summer 19961 A REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT
1064 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1057
C. Voter Confusion
One factor that Madison could not anticipate in forming his pref-
erence for republican over nonrepublican forms of government is the
modern initiative process's potential to confuse the voting population.
In the initiative process, formal deliberation and debate is in effect
replaced by bumper-sticker logic and thirty-second television sound-
bites. These media do not provide meaningful information. Instead,
they furnish a perfect opportunity for "manipulative campaigns
designed to oversimplify the issues and appeal to the electorate's
worst instincts."'-8 It is doubtful whether even the more balanced and
comprehensive ballot pamphlets can do much to correct the problems
of voter ignorance and deception. Educating the typical voter about
the complexities of issues involved in a particular initiative requires
more time and commitment than most voters can muster. 9
Without considering the specific provision of the measure, voters
in search of decisionmaking shortcuts may attempt to align their vote
with a particular sponsor or opponent to a ballot measure, or to vote
for or against an issue based on the initiative's title, without consider-
ing the specific provisions of the measure. These voter shortcuts,
however, are not well designed to lead to salutary outcomes. Names
of initiatives and names of groups supporting and opposing such ini-
tiatives are often unreliable guides. Examples of deceptive advertis-
ing abound in the most recent California election and other recent
state elections. A provision concerning the hunting of mountain lions
was on the California ballot.30 The two groups supporting and oppos-
ing the measure were "Californians for Balanced Wildlife Manage-
ment" and "California Wildlife Protection Coalition."'" What these
names cleverly concealed from even the most conscientious voter was
which group supported the killing of mountain lions and which group
wanted to save them.
Lest the reader think that only mountain lions have generated
such deceptive sponsor titles, "Northwesterners for More Fish" is a
28. Eule, supra note 2, at 1556.
29. Id. at 1508-09 (describing a phone-book sized "pamphlet" full of microscopic, con-
voluted descriptions of various initiatives, bonds, and proposed constitutional amendments
that were beyond his comprehension). Eule also observed, "[A] 1976 Massachusetts sur-
vey revealed that persons in the lowest income category were the most likely to state that
they could not vote on a proposition because it was too long and they were unable to assess
what a yes or no vote would mean." Id at 1515 n.45 (citing D. MAGLEBY, DIREcr LEGis-
LATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 116 (1984)).
30. Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 197, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
PRIMARY ELECTION, MARcH 26, 1996, at 28-31, 59-61.
31. Id.
group of utilities and companies interested in clear cutting and lower
water quality control standards.32 "Friends of Eagle Mountain," a
group formed to further the interests of a mining company, "wants to
create the world's largest landfill in an abandoned iron ore pit."' 33 The
"National Wilderness Institute" wants to roll back wetlands regulation
in the Endangered Species Act.34 And, of course, it cannot be over-
looked that the "California Civil Rights Initiative," whose purpose is
to curtail policies and programs designed to benefit underprivileged
minorities, borrowed its name from a movement designed to imple-
ment some of those very same policies and programs.
Confusion caused by deceptive rhetoric has been exacerbated by
another "recent innovation in obfuscation. '36 Competing interest
groups, no longer satisfied in manipulating voters on their way to the
polling booth, have turned to manipulation of voters through the bal-
lot itself. Now competing propositions are placed on the same
ballot.37
To be sure, efforts at voter manipulation are not always success-
ful,38 and legislators are certainly capable of being duped. These ex-
amples demonstrate the risks of manipulation and confusion when the
32. Jane Fritsch, Name-Calling Environmental Groups Say Foes Try to Sound Friendly,
N.Y. TIMEs, March 25, 1996, at Al.
33. I&
34. Id. at A8.
35. Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 209, in CALnEORNiA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 5, 1996 (forthcoming Sept. 1996).
36. Eule, supra note 2, at 1517.
37. See id. Professor Eule described how this tactic was used effectively by Occidental
Petroleum:
The Los Angeles City Council had entered into a contract with Occidental giving
the company the right to drill for oil beneath one of the city's coastal communi-
ties. Some concerned citizens collected signatures for an initiative (Proposition
0) designed to bar the drilling. Occidental qualified a competing initiative (Prop-
osition P) which incredibly appeared to oppose offshore drilling. Only the most
perceptive of readers could grasp the hidden intent of Occidental's effort-to
mandate onshore drilling. Occidental then compounded its deception by adver-
tising Proposition P as environmental legislation and entitling it "The Los Ange-
les Public Protection, Coastal Protection, and Energy Resources Initiative." It
enlisted a former Governor, Edmund "Pat" Brown, to write a letter to the voters.
Brown urged the defeat of Proposition 0 because, unlike Proposition P, it "con-
tains not a single word in opposition to offshore oil drilling." A legal effort to
strike Occidental's measure from the ballot as fraudulent was denied by a state
court judge, who unwittingly damned the entire California process of direct de-
mocracy by concluding that Proposition P was "probably no more misleading
than any other initiative."
Id. at 1517-18 (citations omitted).
38. Charlow, supra note 4, at 628-29 (noting that in Professor Eule's example of the
California smoking referendum, the powerful smoking lobby lost, despite the excesses of
its campaign).
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decisions are made without proper information and the process lacks
formal procedures for deliberation and debate.
D. Measuring "Legislative" Intent
Another problem with lawmaking direct from the people con-
cerns how the courts are to discern the underlying intent or purpose of
the law. When courts are presented with cases in which claimants
challenge laws as violations of their individual rights, courts must
weigh the depth of the rights claimed against government's interest in
enacting the law. The government's interest is usually inferred from
the legislative intent of the statute together with contextual clues on
which courts might depend. Similarly, when courts struggle with con-
struing ambiguous provisions of laws, legislative intent is paramount.
But how is the collective intent of a voting populace to be measured?
The difficulties in gauging voter intent are exacerbated when whatever
"voter intent" exists is hidden by a subterfuge of voter manipulation
and deceptive advertising."
III. Unconditional Enforcement of Structural Constitutional
Provisions: No Room for Balancing
If direct democracy is an ill against which the Constitution sought
to protect, the question remains how that protection is to be effected.
By letting the political process take care of itself?40 By intervention
of the courts? If so, which courts, state or federal?4" Should courts
merely engage in a more exacting review of direct legislation, or hold
that all direct legislation is invalid as a per se violation of the Guaran-
tee Clause? The proposed solutions are as bountiful as the law review
articles on this subject. This Essay proposes a simple solution based
on the purpose and structural function of the Guarantee Clause.
39. Referring to Professor Eule's example, a court evaluating voter intent of Proposi-
tion P sponsored by Occidental Petroleum might conclude, based on a review of the adver-
tising literature, that voters intended to enact environmentally protective legislation. The
court might then have a difficult time, in light of this perceived purpose, if asked to inter-
pret the provisions mandating onshore oil drilling. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1517-18.
40. See Charlow, supra note 4, at 626-29 (doubting that opponents of direct democracy
have made a convincing case about the dangers of the initiative process and arguing that
the solution to existing problems is to "[ljet the political process take care of itself").
41. See Linde, supra note 4, at 728 (arguing that despite the Supreme Court's holdings
that it is nonjusticiable, state courts are still free to consider Guarantee Clause challenges
and state judges "are specifically bound to apply the Constitution as the supreme law of
the land").
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Federal courts are the traditional forum in which constitutional
wrongs are set right.4 2 In the context of the Guarantee Clause, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has presented a formidable obstacle to fed-
eral court review of any Guarantee Clause challenge by continually
holding that "questions arising under [the Guarantee Clause] are
political, not judicial, in character, and thus for the consideration of
Congress, and not the courts.14 3 The specific rationales supporting
the Court's unwillingness to decide Guarantee Clause challenges have
been criticized by many commentators. 44 More recently, the Court's
obstinance appears to be softening. 45 This Essay does not directly ad-
dress the justiciability questions. Instead, in anticipation that the
Court will ultimately assume its responsibility in reviewing Guarantee
Clause challenges, this Essay addresses the substantive issues the
Court will face at that time.
As envisioned by Madison and the other constitutional Framers,
the guarantee of a republican form of government is a structural pro-
vision designed to prevent the instability and oppression of voting mi-
norities associated with direct democracy. The language of the
Guarantee Clause indicates its structural purpose. The Clause re-
quires a state process of decisionmaking that checks factious majori-
ties. It also describes a relationship between the federal government
and the states in which the federal government acts as guarantor to
ensure that the states adhere to their republican obligations. Any lin-
gering ambiguities about the structural purpose of the Guarantee
42. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, TiH LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15 (1962) (arguing
that "the Framers... expected that the federal courts would assume a power-of whatever
exact dimensions-to pass on the constitutionality of actions of the Congress and the Presi-
dent, as well as of the several states").
43. Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1930); see also
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (refusing to adjudicate a claim that
a law enacted through the Oregon initiative process was unconstitutional under the Guar-
antee Clause).
44. See, eg., Fountaine, supra note 2, at 766-68 (arguing that commitment to another
branch of government is not a tenable basis for maintaining clause as nonjusticiable); Berg,
supra note 4, at 217 (concluding that "textual commitment" to another branch is weak
support for nonjusticiability and has been abandoned by the Court).
45. Although the Court ultimately declined to reach the merits of the Guarantee
Clause challenge in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), it indicated that it may
be rethinking its traditional approach to the Guarantee Clause as nonjusticiable. Writing
for the Majority, Justice O'Connor noted that "[m]ore recently, the Court has suggested
that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political
questions .... Contemporary commentators have likewise suggested that courts should
address the merits of such claims, at least in some circumstances." Id. at 2433 (citations
omitted).
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Clause are dispelled by even the most cursory reference to the Fram-
ers' defenses of the republican form.46
Few dispute that "republican form" as described in the Guaran-
tee Clause means representative, not direct, democracy.4 7 Why then
have so many scholars concluded that the most blatant example of
direct democracy, direct vote by initiative, is not a per se violation of
the Clause?
The conclusion that the Guarantee Clause is not violated by state
initiatives has its roots in two faulty premises. The first errant premise
begins with the observation that other representative elements of state
governments continue to exist. Because direct legislation merely sup-
plements those representative elements-in other words, because ini-
tiative lawmaking is only ancillary to those institutions-these
scholars argue, it is not a per se violation of the Guarantee Clause.48
This cramped interpretation ignores the purpose and nature of
the Clause. As a structural provision, the Guarantee Clause
prescribes a process of lawmaking. It does not guarantee against a
specific result, and it is not a general rule of thumb that can be devi-
ated from as long as the primary structure of state governments re-
mains representative. When only some of a state's laws are directly
enacted, the threats of factional passions may be less pervasive, but
they are no less dangerous. Nor are they less violative of the Guaran-
tee Clause. The importance of this conclusion is nowhere more appar-
ent than in those instances in which the initiative process enacts laws
that are immune from legislative renunciation, as is the case with pop-
ular amendments to the California Constitution.49
46. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 43 (James Madison), No. 79 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
47. For a dissenting, though widely respected, opinion, see Akhil R. Amar, The Central
Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denomi-
nator Problem, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 749, 756-59 (1994) (concluding "that the Anti-direct
democracy reading of the Republican Government Clause of Article IV is 'not proven').
48. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 2, at 1544 (rejecting the notion that initiatives are per se
unconstitutional because they serve only an ancillary role); Linde, supra note 3, at 26 (criti-
cizing early judicial opinions for concluding that a state government's entire form was
either republican or not, "and if not, then the validity of all acts of the entire government
were [sic] threatened"). Although Professor Linde criticizes the flawed reasoning that led
the Oregon Supreme Court to conclude that the general practice of lawmaking by initiative
is not a nonrepublican form, he nevertheless stops short of concluding that initiative
processes are unconstitutional in principle. See id. at 41-45. Instead, he concludes that,
while constitutional in principle, initiative lawmaking nevertheless violates the Guarantee
Clause when it in fact demonstrates prejudicial animus. Id.
49. We do not mean to imply that the Guarantee Clause prescribes state citizens' right
to amend state constitutions by a supermajority.
A second error that has led scholars astray is a tendency to mis-
construe the Clause's structural protection for votingminorities as
solely a substantive protection for discreet and insular minorities and
for individual liberties.5 0 Undeniably, representative lawmaking
reduces the likelihood that unpopular minorities and individual liberty
interests will suffer oppression from a wanton, unchecked majority.
However, the dangers of popular government, and the Founders' con-
cern with it, extend beyond possible infringements on individual
rights. As Madison commented, "the form of popular govern-
ment.., enables [a majority faction] to sacrifice to its ruling passion
or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens."'" Put
another way, the Founders preferred the republican form because
popular democracy put not only individual liberties but also "the pub-
lic good" at risk. 2
Madison recognized the threat posed by majority factions' pro-
pensity to sacrifice the public good for self-interest:
Complaints are everywhere heard ... that our governments are
too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts
of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor
party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing
majority 3
While the threat a majority faction poses to individual rights may be
more odious, its threat to the public good is probably more prevalent.
Many, if not most, legislative decisions involve mundane quandaries
that, while bound up with the public good, are devoid of questions
that impinge upon the balance between government interests (ex-
pressed as majority will) and individual liberties. Governments must
decide how much tax to levy, the proper days for collection of gar-
bage, the allocation of funding for schools and social programs, infra-
structure planning, environmental policies, and the like. In each of
these contexts, there will be a majority and a minority. Most often the
minority involved will be a simple voting minority, not one of the dis-
50. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 851 ("[Tjhe Guarantee Clause should be
regarded as a protector of basic individual rights .. "); Linde, supra note 3, at 41-43
(proposing five tests for courts to use to determine when initiative measures carry indicia
of prejudicial animus and thus run afoul of the Guarantee Clause); Salz, supra note 4, at
117 ("A Guarantee Clause challenge to a discrimination-prone initiative can provide a
substantive safeguard for the rights threatened by this type of legislation.").
51. Madison, THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 7, at 132 (emphasis added).
52. Id
53. Id at 129-130.
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creet and insular variety.54 By protecting these voting minorities, the
Guarantee Clause ensures a political process that will be more respon-
sive to the public good. Indeed, Madison hypothesized that in a re-
public, "it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public
good than if pronounced by the people themselves.15 5
In his survey of American society and politics, Alexis de Toc-
quevile provides a good, if somewhat antiquated, illustration of
Madison's concern about majority factions displacing the public good:
In America there is no law against fraudulent bankruptcies, not
because they are few, but because they are many. The dread of
being prosecuted as a bankrupt is greater in the minds of the
majority than the fear of being ruined by the bankruptcy of
others; and a sort of guilty tolerance is extended by the public
conscience to an offense which everyone condemns in his indi-
vidual capacity.56
Although this example of majoritarian self-interest has since been de-
feated by more principled bankruptcy laws, other examples of major-
ity self-interested legislation are plentiful.57
While individual liberties and unpopular minorities enjoy the
benefits of the Guarantee Clause, those benefits are only part of the
overall purpose of the Clause. One of the most notable accomplish-
ments of the Constitution is its solutions to the threats that
majoritarian tyranny poses to individual liberty. The Constitution had
other purposes too, including the establishment of a stable federation,
composed of states that rule themselves with a common standard of
legitimate government.5 8 Commentators who conclude that initiatives
54. See Charlow, supra note 4, at 534 n.27 (using the phrase "'electoral minorities'...
to emphasize that it is not minorities in the modern colloquial sense that were to be the
particular beneficiaries of the Framers' scheme, but rather the structural safeguards insti-
tuted by the Framers were to benefit any group that would not get the result it desired if a
simple popular majority vote were taken").
55. Madison, Ti FEDERALiST No. 10, supra note 7, at 134.
56. 1 ALEXiS DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 239 (Phillips Bradley, ed.
& Francis Bowen, trans., Vintage Books 1945) (1862).
57. Perhaps the most blatant and regrettable example of popular democracy's self-
interest is California's Proposition 13. Proposition 13 enacted an acquisition-value taxation
system that benefitted longer-term property owners over those purchasing later. By 1992,
when the United States Supreme Court rejected an Equal Protection challenge to the law,
some home owners were paying five times the amount in property taxes as their neighbors
whose property was of equivalent value. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
Space prohibits an extended diatribe on the effect Proposition 13 has had on California's
educational system. Suffice it to say that this initiative illustrates well the danger in direct
democracy that the people, if it were within their means, would vote themselves a raise.
58. In describing the purpose of the Guarantee Clause, Madison noted that
"[g]overnments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a fed-
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violate the Guarantee Clause only when they implicate individual lib-
erties fail to recognize the Clause's broader purpose, which is to en-
sure stable, legitimate governments in the individual states.
Understanding why these commentators' premises are faulty also
helps explain why their proposed solution, heightened scrutiny of
direct legislation, is inappropriate. Heightened scrutiny is a form of
balancing. With individual rights challenges to legislative pronounce-
ments, the Court balances the depth of the right at stake with the
strength of the government interest.5 9 But in the case of the Guaran-
tee Clause, there is nothing to balance. Structural provisions do not
have competing interests that can be balanced. The question of
whether a state government that allows an initiative process is republi-
can in form must be decided categorically. To be sure, some govern-
mental forms will reside closer to the line than others, for the
boundaries of the republican form itself are ambiguous. Hence, a pro-
cess whereby voters send proposed legislation to the state legislature
for action presents very different concerns than does the California
initiative process, which permits amendment of the state constitution
by direct vote of the majority. Any ambiguity, however, must be re-
solved definitionally and systemically. Unlike laws that infringe indi-
vidual liberty, the guarantee of a republican form of government is a
guarantee of a mode of decisionmaking intended to produce both sat-
isfactory process and salutary results. The protection afforded by the
Guarantee Clause, however, does not diminish the need for substan-
tive review when representational democracy infringes individual lib-
erty. We pray for enlightened governors, but prepare for despots.
The republican form encourages enlightenment through deliberation;
the Bill of Rights provides the last defense for liberty.
IV. Conclusion
The Guarantee Clause mandates that the states govern them-
selves in a manner that reduces the risk that individual rights or the
public good will be subverted, and it ensures a federal remedy should
the states stray from that mandate. It guarantees a process of deci-
eral coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 312
(James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
59. For example, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court balanced the wo-
man's right to reproductive choice against the strength of the state's interest in protecting
the woman's health and the life of the fetus. Similarly, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), the Court balanced the right of the press to print freely, even if that
freedom included the possibility of printing false or defamatory statements, against the
government's interest in protecting the reputations of public officials.
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sionmaking better tailored to avoid the passions and prejudices of the
day. If the Supreme Court decides to consider Guarantee Clause
challenges, it will have many delicate decisions to make. For example,
are local initiatives and referenda violative of the Guarantee Clause?
What about voter recalls of elected representatives? Apportionment
schemes for voting districts? But the one issue that should not cause
much consternation for the Court is the unconstitutionality of state
initiative processes. The Founders were clear in their preference for
representative democracy over direct democracy, and they clearly ex-
pressed their preference in a structural provision in the Constitution.
If there is any doubt left regarding the Founders' wisdom in this re-
gard, the Court need only observe the results of modern state initia-
tive processes.
